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Quantum Theories of Consciousness
Imants Barušs
King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario
The assumption is often made in conventional cognitive science that consciousness is a com-
putational process resulting from macroscopic neural activity as described by classical phys-
ics. That assumption has been questioned both because it has been unsuccessful in explaining 
consciousness and because it is based on outdated ideas about the nature of matter. More 
contemporary quantum theories may be more successful for understanding cognition. For 
example, Mari Jibu, Kunio Yasue, and Yasushi Takahashi have proposed a theory of memory 
as a spinor ﬁeld underlying cortical dipoles in which quantum mechanical tunnelling instanti-
ates memory decay and in which the creation of Goldstone bosons is the process of memory 
recall. Or, more radically, as proposed by Eugene Wigner, consciousness itself could be a causal 
agent that collapses the state vector describing physical reality. For Evan Harris Walker, such 
an eﬀect occurs at synapses in the brain thereby regulating its electrochemical activity. Ac-
cording to Henry Stapp, Jeﬀrey Schwartz, and Mario Beauregard it is the attention density of 
our ongoing experiential stream that modulates neural activity through the quantum Zeno 
eﬀect with demonstrated implications for the treatment of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. 
Such ideas address the possibility of the existence of a pre-physical substrate, akin to David 
Bohm=s implicate order, which could also be the referent of the transcendent consciousness 
experienced by John Wren-Lewis and Franklin Wolﬀ. The notion of a deep consciousness as a 
pre-physical substrate from which physical reality is precipitated is one way in which some of 
the ideas of the theorists presented here could be integrated. It would be worth pursuing this 
line of investigation to determine eventually the goodness of ﬁt of the resultant theories with 
observational data.3
Keywords: Consciousness, quantum theories, cognition.
Motivation for Quantum Theories
Why should we consider quantum theories of consciousness? There are a couple 
of reasons. The ﬁrst is the failure of classical computationalism to adequately explain 
cognition and, in particular, consciousness. By “classical computationalism” I am re-
ferring to standard computer analogue and connectionist models of cognition (e.g., 
Pylyshyn, 1986). These models have some value as metaphors, just as the psychody-
namic conceptualization of the psyche as a hydraulic system or the behaviourist tel-
ephone switchboard have their usefulness. But intractable problems arise when these 
metaphors are taken seriously as actual explanations of reality. These problems have 
always existed (e.g., Barwise, 1986), but have become more obvious with time. As Jerry 
Fodor (2000) has said: “I would have thought that the last forty or ﬁfty years have 
demonstrated pretty clearly that there are aspects of higher mental processes into 
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which the current armamentarium of computational models, theories, and experi-
mental techniques oﬀers vanishingly little insight” (p. 2). In my case, over the course of 
more than a decade of carefully analysing them, I have found computational theories 
of consciousness to be so riddled with lacunae (e.g., Barušs, 1990a; 1990b; 1992; 1995; 
1998) that I do not see any hope for them in the near future and have stopped paying 
attention to them. The point is that we need a good alternative to computationalism.
The second reason why we should consider quantum theories of consciousness 
has to do with grounding our understanding of the psyche in the best theories of 
physical reality. We need to understand the biological substrate of cognition, as, in-
deed, we try to do in neuroscience. But as Patricia Churchland (1980) has said: “For 
purists, the real bottom will of course belong not to neuroscience but to physics” (p. 
207). Well, I am certainly a purist and welcome the role of physics in explanations of 
consciousness. However, “until recently, virtually all attempts to understand the func-
tional activity of the brain have been based, at least implicitly, on some principles of 
classical physics that have been known to be fundamentally false for three-quarters 
of a century” (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard, 2005, p. 1310). Neuroscientiﬁc theories 
based solely on classical physics are bound to fail because they do not take into ac-
count the occurrence of quantum phenomena. For this we need quantum theory. 
As Jibu and Yasue (2004) have pointed out: “It seems of much importance now to let 
the neuro- and cognitive scientists know the truth: it is necessary to rely on quan-
tum theory . . .” (p. 287) and “incorporation of quantum theory into the investiga-
tion of brain functioning is an inevitable turning point of the consciousness research” 
(p. 288). Thus, it is necessary to consider quantum processes in any theory of cognition.
Relinquishing traditional computational theories and embracing quantum theo-
ries of cognition leads to a shift in the level of physical reality at which mental events 
can be thought of as taking place. Rather than emerging as a byproduct of cellular 
activity, mentation can be viewed as occurring within the molecules constituting bio-
logical organisms. In particular, consciousness, as an experiential stream, could be a 
phenomenon associated with subatomic events. Furthermore, consciousness could be 
inextricably interwoven into the fabric of physical reality in essential ways.
Condensation Theories
One way of thinking about mentation as a quantum process is to associate it 
with Fröhlich’s Bose-Einstein-like condensation. When a boson gas, such as a dilute 
gas of rubidium atoms, is cooled suﬃciently, it undergoes a phase transition whereby 
the condensed bosons collectively fall into their lowest possible energy states. The 
resulting condensate is an ordered state in which the condensed particles behave in a 
coordinated manner (cf. Annett, 2004; Daintith, 2005). Something similar occurs in a 
biological system. According to Herbert Fröhlich, if energy is supplied to oscillating 
electrical dipoles, such as “protein molecules or parts of cell walls,” (Marshall, 1989, p. 
80) some of that energy will go into the “lowest collective frequency mode” (p. 79) of 
the oscillators. Because of the properties of matter at the subatomic scale, the eﬀect 
that this would have would be that of creating greater coherence between the separate 
parts of that biological system.
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Mari Jibu, Yasushi Takahashi, and Kunio Yasue used these types of ideas to try to 
account for memory. For Jibu et al., proteins surrounded by water in the brain con-
stitute a system of “corticons” which can go into an ordered state known as a “spinor 
ﬁeld.” Incoming energy, gated through interactions with classical constituents of a cell, 
is a source of data for the corticons which then encode that information through a 
phase transition until such time as it decays through quantum mechanical tunnelling. 
Memory retrieval occurs when a signal similar to the encoded information prompts 
recall through the creation of Goldstone bosons (Jibu & Yasue, 2004; Takahashi & 
Jibu, 2004). Quantum mechanical tunnelling is a process whereby subatomic particles 
can escape energy barriers that would not be possible to transcend through classical 
means (cf. Goswami, 1997/2003), whereas Goldstone bosons are massless particles 
created in conditions such as those considered by Jibu et al. (Daintith, 2005; Sudbery, 
1986). Although some of the details of this theory need clariﬁcation, it does suggest a 
way in which memory could be encoded in the quantum states of electrical dipoles in 
the brain rather than being a function of cellular biochemistry.
Collapse Theories
Before it is observed, there is no single state in which physical reality exists. Rath-
er, there is a superposition of possible physical realities whose description is called the 
“state vector.” At the time of observation, one of the possibilities becomes the physi-
cal reality that is actually experienced. All of the other possibilities either disappear 
or continue on their own trajectories as alternate physical realities, depending upon 
one’s point of view. Or, as some physicists have posited, environmental eﬀects intro-
duce “decoherence” that erases some of the possibilities, although it does not appear as 
though all of them can be thus made to vanish (Adler, 2003). If the alternate realities 
are believed to disappear entirely in addition to any decoherence eﬀects, then the state 
vector is said to have “collapsed.” The problem, known as the “measurement problem,” 
becomes that of determining the cause of the collapse.
One solution to the measurement problem has been to say that consciousness, 
acting as a non-physical source of intervention, causes the collapse of the state vector. 
This was the position taken, for example, by Eugene Wigner (1972): “. . . the ‘reduction 
of the wave packet’ . . . takes place whenever the result of an observation enters the 
consciousness of the observer or, to be even more painfully precise, my own con-
sciousness, since I am the only observer, all other people being only subjects of my 
observations” (p. 137). However, if we are going to go down this road, then it makes 
sense to separate out two aspects of measurement, namely one which notes the eﬀects 
of the collapse of the state vector and the other which triggers the collapse. And so 
consciousness can be thought of as having both an observational capacity and a voli-
tional agency (Barušs, 1986). Evan Harris Walker (2000) has also, in eﬀect, made this 
distinction, noting that it is the will which causes the collapse of the state vector.
Walker (1970; 1977; 2000) has said that the exercise of the will to collapse the state 
vector occurs, in particular, at synapses between nerve cells, resulting in modulation of 
electrochemical communication processes taking place in the brain. An electrochemi-
cal impulse arriving at a synapse creates an electrical potential across the synaptic cleft 
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leading to quantum mechanical tunnelling of electrons from postsynaptic to presyn-
aptic structures. According to Walker, the tunnelling electrons induce conformational 
changes to presynaptic macromolecules thereby triggering the release of neurotrans-
mitter. Walker has postulated that these eﬀects are propagated throughout the brain by 
“hopping conduction” along ribonucleic acid molecules (Walker, 2000, p. 229). Because 
all of the electrons involved in this process are indistinguishable, the tunnelling and 
propagation of these electrons can be regarded as the activity of a single electron, there-
by producing the kind of coordinated activity necessary to account for the nature of 
consciousness. For Walker, “consciousness is the collection of potentialities that develop 
as these electrons and these structures of the brain interact” (p. 237). Will, by causing the 
state vector to collapse in a particular manner, initiates this electron cascade, thereby se-
lecting which synapses will ﬁre and, hence, determining our experience and behaviour.
Henry Stapp, together with some colleagues, has developed a similar idea. For 
Stapp, when we talk about consciousness collapsing the state vector, we are talking 
about the inﬂuence of our ongoing subjective stream of consciousness. The example 
that Stapp has used is that of raising one’s arm. I think I would like to raise my arm and 
then my arm goes up. In this manner we have mental causation. The evidence to sub-
stantiate such a causal notion of volition comes from Jeﬀrey Schwartz’s brain-imaging 
studies of “self-directed neuroplasticity,” whereby changes to the right caudate nucleus 
were found after ten weeks of cognitive-behavioural therapy for Obsessive-Compul-
sive Disorder. Furthermore, he found that “dispassionate self-observation” appeared 
to be a critical aspect of the cognitive treatment for it to be eﬀective (Schwartz, 2005; 
Schwartz & Begley, 2002). Of course, one’s experience of volition could be after the fact 
since the brain’s cybernetics operating through more conventionally conceptualized 
physiological processes could be the causal agents also in cases of neuroplasticity.
Stapp et al. call on a quantum phenomenon known as the “quantum Zeno eﬀect” 
to suggest a mechanism for wilful action. Closely spaced repeated observational acts 
can hold a quantum system in a constant state even if there is pressure through classi-
cal mechanisms for it to change. They suggest that what happens is that, as we increase 
the amount of mental eﬀort, we increase the rapidity with which the selection of al-
ternatives occurs. For Stapp et al., “oscillating states of macroscopic subsystems of the 
brain” (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard, 2005, p. 1320; emphases removed) acting in a 
widespread coherent manner instantiate the intended actions, thereby modulating the 
electrochemical neural activity of the brain. In practical terms, then, eﬀort can hold 
in place a “template for action” (p. 1324; emphases removed) by increasing the density 
of attention so that an intended action has a higher probability of occurrence than 
it otherwise would. It should be noted that the quantum Zeno eﬀect, which has been 
observed experimentally outside the context of mind-body interaction, is considered 
by some physicists to be, not an eﬀect of consciousness during an observational proc-
ess, but a decoherence eﬀect (e.g., Polkinghorne, 2002).
The Notion of a Pre-Physical Substrate
With these collapse theories of consciousness, what we have essentially, is the no-
tion of a pre-physical substrate from which causal eﬀects on physical reality can emerge. 
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But there has been a more radical notion in quantum theory outside the context of 
consciousness studies, namely, that physical reality as such emerges from a pre-physical 
substrate. And this applies not just to physical bodies, but to physical space itself, within 
which physical bodies are situated. For example: “. . . space is no longer the all-embracing 
theatre of reality, but a structure that has emerged together with the macroscopic mate-
rial entities that have emerged from the microworld” (Aerts & Aerts, 2005, p. 153).
David Bohm has used the notion of an “implicate order” to conceptualize a pre-
physical substrate (Bohm, 1980/1983; Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Factor, 1985). His ideas 
can be illustrated with the following analogy. One of the physical phenomena that is 
predicted by quantum mechanics but whose existence is not possible within classical 
physics, is that of entanglement. In some cases, subatomic processes remain connected 
in non-local ways. For example, under some conditions, a photon moving away from 
another in the opposite direction from it can nonetheless behave in such a manner 
as to “take into account” the activity of the distant photon. Bohm has used the ex-
ample of ﬁsh in a tank to discuss such quantum entanglement: Imagine two images 
taken with two separate cameras, from two diﬀerent angles, of a single ﬁsh, projected 
onto two separate television screens. How is it that the ﬁsh on the second screen can 
so perfectly copy what the ﬁsh on the ﬁrst screen does? Well, it is not at all unusual 
since they are both images of the same ﬁsh. In the same way “... we may regard each 
of the ‘particles‘constituting a system as a projection of a ‘higher-dimensional’ reality” 
(Bohm, 1980/1983, p. 188). According to Bohm, what we experience, our conscious-
ness as well as the physical world, is an explication of an implicate order.
The notion of a pre-physical substrate is also found in some cases of alterations 
of consciousness. For example, following an opiate-induced coma, John Wren-Lewis 
(1994) felt that “some kind of brain-cataract [had been] removed, making unobscured 
perception possible for the ﬁrst time” (p. 109). Upon examination of his experience, 
he found a “dazzling darkness” (p. 109) underlying his ordinary consciousness that 
was so palpable that it seemed as though the back of his head were exposed to the 
inﬁnite reaches of space. This underlying darkness gave rise to the physical world so 
that: “... what I perceive with my eyes and other senses is a whole world that seems to 
be coming fresh-minted into existence moment by moment ...” (Wren-Lewis, 1988, p. 
116). Similarly, following his experience of enlightenment, Franklin Wolﬀ has main-
tained that our subject-object experience of reality arises from a generative underly-
ing substrate. In fact, for Wolﬀ, “... consciousness is itself the substantial substrate ...” 
(Merrell-Wolﬀ, 1995, p. 195).
I agree with Wolﬀ, in that I think that the pre-physical substrate has the quality of 
consciousness. Not consciousness in the sense of an ongoing experiential stream, but 
“deep consciousness” as a normally inaccessible aspect of our psyches of which our 
ordinary consciousness is a byproduct. This is consistent with Amit Goswami‘s (1993) 
contention that “... our consciousness is the consciousness of the Being that is beyond 
the subject-object split” (p. 187; emphases removed). Thus it is possible that such “... 
non-local consciousness... collapses the brain-mind from outside space-time...” (Gos-
wami, 1993, p. 186). In such a quantum theory of consciousness, it is not that quantum 
theory explains consciousness, but rather that quantum theory allows for the under-
standing of a possible relationship of consciousness to physical matter.
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I think that consciousness, in the sense of deep consciousness as a pre-physical 
substrate, analogous to the implicate order, could be giving rise to space-time with its 
constituent corporeality. Intentions within one‘s experiential stream, as aspects of the 
deeper consciousness, perhaps actualized as a coherent subatomic system through 
Fröhlich‘s Bose-Einstein-like condensation, could aﬀect physical reality by directing 
the collapse of the state vector at synapses, thereby modulating the electrochemical 
activity of neurons. In this way, some of the ideas of the theorists presented here could 
be integrated. It would be worth pursuing this line of investigation to determine even-
tually the goodness of ﬁt of the resultant theories with observational data.
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